Build Your Security for Assume Breach, Not for Good Hygiene

Adi Chemoul's avatar
Adi Chemoul VP Marketing

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In the first half of 2024 alone, the cybersecurity landscape was rocked by high-profile incidents, including the Snowflake data breach and major compromises at Microsoft, that shared a common, devastating thread: stolen credentials and compromised secrets. These weren’t sophisticated “zero-day” exploits of technical flaws; they were attackers simply “logging in” using valid, but stolen, identities to compromise entire organizations.

For years, the industry has preached “cyber hygiene”, the digital equivalent of brushing your teeth: use strong passwords, patch your systems, and don’t click suspicious links. While essential, hygiene is no longer enough to serve as a strategy.

The problem with the “cyber hygiene” metaphor is that it suggests a simple pass or fail, either your credentials are clean and you’re safe, or they’re dirty and you’re exposed. In reality, keys and tokens can be handled “perfectly”: stored in a vault, scoped carefully, rotated on schedule, and still end up in the hands of an attacker. Recent incidents, including the Snowflake and Microsoft-related breaches, reinforced a hard truth: attackers don’t always need to exploit vulnerabilities if they can just log in with valid credentials.

The Speed of Development Has Outpaced Hygiene

Today’s “ship-it-yesterday” development culture doesn’t give security teams the luxury of relying solely on best practices and good hygiene. As organizations race to adopt new technologies, the basics can get buried under delivery pressure. In a world of microservices, CI/CD pipelines, and now agentic AI, the perimeter is no longer a fixed wall you can keep “clean.”

If your strategy is built only on hygiene and best practice, your organization can collapse the moment a developer hardcodes a secret, an employee falls for a sophisticated phishing attack, or an OAuth key in a third-party SaaS app is compromised. In today’s complex environments, security teams need a breach-ready approach: harden posture, tighten exposure, and assume compromise, then build controls that contain blast radius and keep you operating when it happens.

What “Building for Breach” Actually Means

If we accept that compromise is inevitable, that credentials will be stolen, insiders will exist, and trust boundaries will be crossed, the security model shifts entirely.

This shift matters even more now because automation and agentic AI are exploding the number of non-human identities, secrets, AI agents, and MCP connections across every environment. What used to be a manageable set of service accounts and API keys is turning into a massive, fast-changing web of machine access. That growth is quietly expanding the attack surface, yet this vector still doesn’t get the attention, visibility, or shared understanding it deserves, especially when it comes to how easily one compromised identity can cascade into an organization-wide breach.

Minimize/Reduce Risk Where and When Possible

In the identity security world, the leading attack vector is still secret-based access, API keys, tokens, shared credentials, and long-lived secrets that attackers can steal and reuse. The good news is this risk can be minimized to near-elimination by moving from secrets-based access to identity-based access. In practice, that means extending the machine identity model the major cloud providers already use internally to everything else in your environment: internal services, SaaS tools, pipelines, agents, and MCP servers. With a battle-tested framework like SPIFFE, workloads get strong, verifiable identities and short-lived credentials, so access is granted based on identity and policy instead of static secrets.

This shift strips a huge part of the security burden away from developers and DevOps, who shouldn’t be in the business of handling and protecting long-lived secrets. Instead, security teams regain control through centralized policy, consistent identity issuance, and enforcement that holds even when something is compromised.

Building for breach means assuming one of those identities will be compromised and designing so it doesn’t become a full-org incident: remove long-lived secrets, eliminate standing access, enforce right-sized and just-in-time permissions at runtime, and make actions fully attributable so you can detect, contain, and keep your business operating when compromise happens.

Cyber hygiene is the starting line, not the strategy. In a world where attackers don’t break in, they log in, security must shift from the impossible goal of absolute prevention to the essential reality of breach-ready resilience, building a system that assumes compromise and is engineered to survive it.

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Why Storm the Castle When You Already Hold the Keys to the Kingdom?

Yuval Lazar's avatar
Yuval Lazar Head of Security Research

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What the Salesloft and Gainsight Breaches Really Tell Us About NHI Risk

For years, enterprises have fortified their perimeter – hard MFA, hardened SaaS, locked-down identity layers. But in 2025, the weakest link isn’t the castle gate anymore. It’s the messenger walking through it with unquestioned trust.

In today’s ecosystem, that messenger is an integration with privileged access, and the recent Salesloft and Gainsight breaches exposed just how vulnerable that blind spot is. Attackers didn’t battle their way in – they entered as invited guests.

Security teams who understand this shift are already ahead of the rest of the industry.

The Pattern: Compromise the Integration, Skip the Hard Part

Salesloft to Salesforce

In August 2025, threat actor UNC6395 compromised OAuth and refresh tokens tied to the Drift integration.
Those tokens – trusted Non-Human Identities (NHIs) – opened direct, legitimate access to hundreds of Salesforce orgs.

Once inside, attackers didn’t stop at CRM data. They exfiltrated downstream secrets:

  • Snowflake tokens
  • Cloud access keys
  • Support-case content
  • Internal operational metadata

They bypassed MFA and stepped straight into authenticated privilege.

Gainsight to Salesforce

On November 21, Just weeks later, Salesforce disclosed unusual activity tied to another integration – Gainsight.
Again: no Salesforce vulnerability, no platform exploit.

The door was opened by an integration holding elevated OAuth scopes – another NHI trusted by default. Salesforce’s statement was unambiguous: “No indication that this resulted from any vulnerability in the Salesforce platform.”

Salesforce revoked all active access and refresh tokens for the gainsight apps and removed those apps temporarily from the AppExchange. New reporting suggests the Gainsight breach might reuse secrets taken from the Salesloft/Drift incident, indicating that attackers are chaining these breaches.

Google Threat Intelligence is attributing the Gainsight breach to the related threat-actors that hit Salesloft (clusters such as UNC6240 / ShinyHunters).

The Shared Pattern: NHIs as High Privilege Attack Vectors

Both breaches followed the same blueprint – and it’s one every modern defender must internalize:

  1. Compromise an integration token (NHI with broad scopes)
  2. Enter customer environments with full legitimacy
  3. Move laterally across connected systems
  4. Harvest embedded credentials and secrets
  5. Pivot into cloud infrastructure

This is large-scale, low-friction supply-chain compromise powered by unmonitored NHIs. Defenders who don’t see this pattern are operating blind.

What You Can Do Now – If You Want to Stay Ahead

1. Inventory premium-scope integrations

Map every integration, service account, and bot touching critical systems.
If you can’t see it, you can’t defend it.

2. Govern third-party integrations like first-class identities

Every vendor app is now part of your attack surface.
Demand audit logs, token controls, and operational transparency.

3. Scope and rotate all tokens / service accounts

Least privilege is not optional.
Long-lived tokens are liabilities – shorten them.
Broad scopes are risks – tighten them.

4. Formalize NHI-focused incident triage

If you find a compromised token:

  • Revoke instantly
  • Rotate downstream secrets
  • Block or delete the previous versions
  • Trace every integration that touched that token
  • Assess which downstream identities could be abused
  • Model possible lateral movement paths

Teams who do this well are the ones who stop incidents early – before attackers reach the crown jewels.

The Bottom Line

Sophisticated attackers no longer storm the castle.
They compromise the trusted identity already carrying the master key – the integration, the bot, the token, the NHI.

Security teams who want to lead – not react, must elevate NHI security to the same level as human identity.
Because in 2025, the kingdom doesn’t fall through the gate – it falls through the integration.

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